A Comprehensive Analysis: Donald Trump's Actions, International Law, and the Question of Acting on Russia's Behalf

I. Executive Summary

This report provides an exhaustive and nuanced analysis of whether the actions and policies of former U.S. President Donald Trump, particularly concerning Russia and Ukraine, can be interpreted as "acting on Russia's behalf." Drawing upon foundational principles of international law, relevant U.S. domestic legal frameworks, and a detailed examination of two distinct periods—the 2019 Trump-Ukraine scandal and the hypothetical 2025 Trump administration's approach to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war—this report navigates the complexities inherent in such an inquiry.

The central finding is that while direct legal proof of Donald Trump acting under the explicit instruction or control of the Russian Federation is not evident in the provided information, his actions and policy shifts have consistently and demonstrably benefited Russia's geopolitical objectives. This benefit stems from a convergence of interests, strategic calculations, and, at times, indirect consequences of actions primarily driven by domestic political agendas. The report highlights a critical distinction between policy alignment and direct agency, emphasizing the high evidentiary bar for attributing a head of state's actions to foreign direction under international law.

Key areas of concern include:

• Challenges to International Legal Norms: Trump's statements and policies have directly challenged core tenets of international law, including the prohibition on the threat or use of force against territorial integrity (UN Charter Article 2(4)), the principle of non-intervention, and the sanctity of treaties (VCLT Article 52). His proposals for "swapping of territories" in Ukraine and his broader rhetoric regarding other sovereign states represent a significant departure from established international legal practice.1

• Domestic Legal Violations: The 2019 withholding of military aid to Ukraine was found to be an illegal impoundment under the U.S. Impoundment Control Act of 1974, highlighting a pattern of executive overreach that undermines congressional authority in foreign policy.3

• Strategic Coercion: The administration's approach, particularly in 2025, has been characterized as "strategic coercion" against Ukraine, eroding its sovereign discretion and potentially forcing it to accept unfavorable terms, thereby legitimizing an aggressor's gains.2

• Undermining Alliances: Consistent questioning of NATO's role and calls for European burden-sharing, while presented as legitimate policy, have contributed to a narrative of weakening transatlantic solidarity, a long-standing Russian strategic objective.6

Ultimately, this report concludes that while the legal threshold for proving direct agency is exceptionally high for a head of state, the cumulative effect of Trump's foreign policy has been profoundly advantageous to Russia. This dynamic underscores a critical accountability gap in international law regarding subtle forms of foreign influence and the weaponization of domestic political vulnerabilities. The implications extend to the credibility of the UN Charter system, the future of collective security, and the stability of the rules-based international order.

II. Introduction: Framing the Inquiry

The question of whether a national leader is "acting on behalf" of a foreign power is one of the most serious and complex allegations in international relations. It transcends mere policy disagreement, implying a level of agency, direction, or subordination that fundamentally compromises national sovereignty and security. This report undertakes a deep research analysis to explore this very question in the context of former U.S. President Donald Trump's actions and policies concerning Russia and Ukraine. The inquiry is particularly salient given the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russia's aggressive posture, and the profound geopolitical implications of U.S. foreign policy.9

The report aims to move beyond superficial accusations to provide a thoroughly reasoned and evidence-based assessment. It acknowledges the inherent difficulty in proving "intent" or "direction" versus mere "policy convergence," especially when dealing with a head of state whose actions are presumed to be sovereign acts of their own nation. The stakes are exceptionally high, as such an assessment touches upon the integrity of international law, the stability of alliances, and the foundational principles of the global order. The core analytical challenge lies in differentiating between actions that benefit a foreign power and those undertaken under its direction. This distinction is paramount for a nuanced legal and geopolitical assessment, as many foreign policy decisions can have unintended or coincidental benefits for other states without implying agency. The analysis will consistently return to this distinction to avoid simplistic conclusions.

Furthermore, the framing of this inquiry within the context of contemporary international relations implicitly acknowledges that weakening the rules-based international order, including its legal principles, can itself be a strategic objective for certain states. Therefore, actions that undermine international law, even if not directly "on behalf" of Russia, could still serve Russia's broader revisionist agenda by creating a more permissive environment for its actions. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a direct challenge to the international legal order.19 If a major power like the United States, through its policies, consistently challenges or disregards international law, it inadvertently or intentionally aids Russia's goal of undermining the existing order. This represents a strategic advantage for Russia that extends beyond specific actions, impacting the very foundation of global governance.

This report is structured to provide a comprehensive and rigorous examination:

• It begins by establishing the foundational principles of international law relevant to state conduct, including the prohibition on the use of force, the principle of non-intervention, and the law of treaties.

• It then delves into the concept of "acting on behalf of a foreign power," examining both U.S. domestic legal frameworks (such as FARA and the Logan Act) and international legal principles of state attribution, alongside historical precedents of foreign influence.

• Two distinct case studies are meticulously analyzed: the 2019 Trump-Ukraine scandal and the hypothetical 2025 Trump administration's approach to the Russia-Ukraine war. Each case is dissected through the lens of the established legal and conceptual frameworks.

• Finally, the report synthesizes the evidence to evaluate the central claim, offering a nuanced assessment of Trump's actions and their broader implications for international law and the global order.

The political and legal scrutiny surrounding Donald Trump's foreign policy decisions, particularly concerning Russia 1, necessitates a deep dive into the complex interplay of domestic politics, international law, and geopolitical strategy.

III. Foundational Principles of International Law

A comprehensive understanding of international law is essential to analyze the complex question of whether a head of state is "acting on behalf" of a foreign power. This section outlines the core principles that govern inter-state relations and provide the legal framework for assessing the conduct under scrutiny.

A. The Prohibition on the Threat or Use of Force (UN Charter Article 2(4))

The cornerstone of the post-World War II international legal order is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which unequivocally states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".32 This prohibition is recognized as a

jus cogens norm, meaning it is a peremptory principle of international law from which no derogation is permitted, binding on all states regardless of treaty ratification.1

Interpretation of "Threat or Use of Force":

While the general prohibition is clear, the precise "threshold" for what constitutes a "use of force" remains a subject of doctrinal debate. Some scholars argue that there is no specific threshold, and any use of lethal force on the territory of another state triggers Article 2(4).32 Others suggest a scale, where "minor coercion" may not "involve the use of force at all; or may involve it to a very low degree".32 Examples cited for actions below the threshold include the arrest of a person by authorities of one state in another state's territory without informing that state, inspection of a foreign vessel, or police measures against an unauthorized foreign aircraft.32 However, intrusion or uninvited presence of military or police organs on foreign soil without actual fighting is also considered.32

For an act to fall within the scope of Article 2(4), it must occur in "international relations" and typically be directed "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state".33 The wording "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" broadens its application beyond direct attacks on territory or political independence.33 Importantly, state support or involvement in forcible acts of other states, or in forcible acts of non-State actors against another State, can also violate this prohibition.33

Article 2(4) explicitly prohibits not only the use of force but also the threat of force.2 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has emphasized that threats are unlawful when the implied use of force would itself be unlawful.5 Manifest threats attributable to a state's leadership can constitute aggression.5

Territorial Integrity and Political Independence:

These terms are fundamental contextual elements of Article 2(4).33 They protect sovereign equality by prohibiting the use of force to settle international disputes.33 International law protects not only territorial boundaries but also the sovereign discretion of states.5 The acquisition of territory through force, often referred to as conquest, is categorically prohibited.2 Russia's invasion of Ukraine is seen as a "clear repudiation of the norm at the core of the UN Charter system on the use of force: the prohibition of forcible annexations of foreign territory".19

This principle serves as the bedrock of the contemporary international legal order, designed to prevent military aggression, maintain state sovereignty, and ensure international peace and security.5 Its consistent application is vital for global stability. The ongoing debate regarding the "threshold" for the use of force 32 and the emergence of "non-forcible coercion" 5 reveals a critical "grey zone" in international law. This ambiguity is not merely academic; it is actively exploited by powerful states. By engaging in "strategic coercion" that falls short of explicit military force but "weaponizes structural asymmetries" 5, states can "cumulatively erode a state's sovereign discretion without crossing the formal threshold of force".5 This allows for significant influence and the achievement of coercive outcomes 5 without triggering the most severe legal prohibitions, thereby challenging the spirit and effectiveness of Article 2(4) even if not its literal letter. This represents a deliberate strategy to achieve coercive ends by leveraging power imbalances, creating a "cumulative environment" where a weaker state's "freedom to say no becomes legally compromised".5 This goes beyond individual acts of pressure to a systemic erosion of sovereign autonomy.

When a jus cogens norm like the prohibition on the use of force is repeatedly challenged or potentially violated by powerful states, including the U.S. (as acknowledged in 19 regarding U.S.-led operations in Kosovo, Iraq, Libya, and Syria), it sets a dangerous precedent. This contributes to a systemic erosion of the international legal framework, making it harder to enforce against other actors (like Russia in Ukraine). This pattern suggests a broader challenge to the credibility and efficacy of the post-WWII international legal order, potentially leading to a more unstable, "might-makes-right" global environment.

B. The Principle of Non-Intervention

Complementing the prohibition on the use of force is the principle of non-intervention, a well-established norm in customary international law.5 This principle prohibits states from coercively interfering in the domestic or external affairs of other states, particularly where such methods are used to affect decisions within a state's

domaine réservé (areas of exclusive national jurisdiction).5 The ICJ, in the

Nicaragua v. United States case (1986), identified "the element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention".35 This prohibition applies regardless of whether military force is involved.5

Coercion in International Law:

While ubiquitous in international relations, coercion is unlawful under international law, yet it lacks a precise definition.37 Scholars attempt to identify the legal threshold distinguishing unlawful acts of coercion from lawful policies of pressure.37 Violations of the non-intervention principle are understood to consist of two elements: the pursuit of unlawful ends (encroaching on a state's

domaine réservé) and the use of unlawful (coercive) means.37 A "coercion continuum" includes military, economic, cyber, and political coercion.37

International law distinguishes between legitimate influence, which allows for negotiation and preserves the agency of the other party, and coercion, which seeks to eliminate that agency.5 The legal threshold for coercion requires more than rhetoric; it demands "evidence of a tangible impairment of sovereign discretion".5 Actions that do not involve military force or traditional sanctions but nonetheless undermine a state's sovereignty fall into a "grey zone" of non-forcible coercion, whose legal status remains unsettled.5 Such actions, including "paternalistic interference" (where powerful states pressure others for ostensibly beneficent purposes), can be harmful by masking self-interested motives, reflecting neo-imperialist assumptions, and depriving targeted states of autonomy.36

The principle of non-intervention sets the "outer limits of permissible influence" states may exert on each other.36 Its absolute nature has diminished with the evolution of self-determination and human rights law, and concepts like "responsibility to protect" may further challenge it.35 However, the core prohibition against dictatorial interference remains fundamental to state sovereignty.

C. The Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) codifies fundamental principles governing international agreements. Central to this discussion is Article 52, which declares: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations".34 This provision aims to safeguard the principle of free consent by preventing an aggressor from extracting contractual advantages through unlawful force.34

Key Aspects of VCLT Article 52:

• Causal Link: The phrase "has been procured" requires a causal link between the unlawful use of armed force and the conclusion of the treaty.34 This means that if a treaty is the direct outcome of military aggression or threats, it is legally invalid.34

• Scope of "Force": The VCLT's drafters debated whether "force" in Article 52 should extend beyond armed force to include political or economic pressure. While some argued for a broader interpretation, the Convention ultimately adopted a narrower view, focusing on armed force.38 This means that treaties concluded under severe economic or political coercion, while potentially problematic under non-intervention principles, may not automatically be void under Article 52, unless they rise to the level of a threat or use of
  armed force.

• Illegality of Gains: Article 52 ties into the obligation of all states not to recognize any illegal gains procured through unlawful force, a principle affirmed by the ICJ.34 This implies that any territorial concessions extracted through aggression would not be legally recognized by the international community.34

• Practical Challenges: The legal rigidity of Article 52 often conflicts with the practical objective of restoring peace, as many peace treaties are outcomes of coercion.34 However, an armistice or agreements focused on cessation of hostilities, humanitarian aid, or prisoner exchanges are generally not deemed "procured by force" and can be valid.34 For concessions like demilitarization or neutrality to be valid, they must be willingly offered, not coerced by military aggression or threats.34

The jus cogens character of the prohibition of the use of force obliges UN Member States and the Security Council not to recognize any gains made by Russia via an illegal war.34 This underscores the legal limitations on any peace deal that would legitimize territorial changes achieved through force.

IV. Defining "Acting on Behalf of a Foreign Power"

To assess whether a leader is "acting on behalf" of a foreign power, it is essential to examine both domestic legal definitions and broader international principles of state attribution, alongside historical contexts of foreign influence.

A. U.S. Domestic Legal Frameworks

In the United States, the concept of acting on behalf of a foreign power is primarily addressed by two key statutes: the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and the Logan Act.

Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA):

FARA, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 611, defines an "agent of a foreign principal" as a person or entity acting on behalf of a foreign government or organization.39 This includes individuals directed or controlled by a foreign principal who engage in activities such as political lobbying, public relations, or fundraising within the United States.39 Key elements include acting under direction, engaging in political activities for the principal, providing public relations or consulting services, soliciting or managing funds, or representing the principal's interests before U.S. government officials.39 FARA mandates registration with the U.S. Department of Justice and disclosure of activities, with failure to comply leading to penalties.39 While FARA primarily targets individuals and entities, not necessarily heads of state, its definition of "agent" provides a framework for understanding what constitutes acting under foreign direction or control.40 The term "foreign government" under U.S. law includes any person or group exercising sovereign de facto or de jure political jurisdiction over any country other than the United States, or any part of such country, and even factions or insurgent bodies assuming governmental authority.40

Logan Act:

The Logan Act (18 U.S.C. § 953), enacted in 1799, criminalizes unauthorized negotiations between an American citizen and a foreign government concerning disputes with the United States.41 Its purpose is to prevent private citizens from undermining the U.S. government's official foreign policy.41 The Act states that "Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both".41

The Act was a direct response to Dr. George Logan's private diplomatic mission to France in 1798, which, despite its apparent success in easing tensions, was seen by the Federalist Party as undermining official U.S. policy.41 The President is considered the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations".41 While the Logan Act has rarely been prosecuted, its existence underscores a historical concern about unauthorized individuals interfering with U.S. foreign policy.41 For a sitting President, the Logan Act is not directly applicable, as the President

is the authorized representative of the United States in foreign relations. However, the spirit of the Act reflects a concern about actions that could be perceived as undermining national interests or aligning with adversarial foreign powers.

B. International Legal Principles of State Attribution

Under international law, the conduct of a person or group of persons is considered an act of a State if that person or group is "in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct".33 This principle, derived from the Articles on State Responsibility, establishes the conditions under which the actions of non-state actors or individuals can be attributed to a state.

For a head of state, the situation is more complex. A head of state's actions are generally presumed to be acts of the state itself, reflecting its sovereign will. Therefore, proving that a head of state is "acting on behalf" of a foreign power in a legal sense would require demonstrating that their actions are not genuinely those of their own state, but rather a direct execution of instructions or control from the foreign power. This sets a very high evidentiary bar, as it would imply a fundamental compromise of the head of state's national loyalty and independence. It would necessitate evidence of explicit directives, coordination, or a clear subordination of national interest to the foreign power's agenda, going beyond mere policy convergence or shared strategic outlook.

C. Historical Precedents of Foreign Influence on U.S. Leaders

Concerns about foreign influence in U.S. politics and on its leaders are not new, dating back to the nation's founding.42 Alexander Hamilton warned against "the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils," and George Washington cautioned against "foreign influence" as "one of the most baneful foes of republican government".43 The Foreign Emoluments Clause, passed in 1787, prohibits federal officials from accepting gifts or titles from foreign governments without congressional consent, reflecting early concerns about undue influence.45

Throughout U.S. history, various foreign entities have attempted to influence American elections and policies. Examples include British covert intervention in the 1940 presidential election to gain support for World War II intervention, and Soviet programs during the Cold War aimed at influencing U.S. public opinion.43 More recently, Russia has been implicated in directing activities against U.S. election infrastructure and spreading disinformation, notably in the 2016 presidential election.43 These efforts often aim to gain strategic influence, polarize society, and disrupt political processes by exacerbating divisive issues.43

While these historical instances demonstrate foreign attempts to influence U.S. politics and leaders, they typically involve covert operations, propaganda, or financial inducements rather than direct control over a sitting head of state's official actions. The Aldrich Ames case, where a CIA officer spied for the Soviet KGB from 1985 to 1994, is an example of an individual acting on behalf of a foreign power, compromising national security.46 However, this involved a clandestine agent, not a publicly elected head of state. Prosecutions of former political leaders for various crimes, including corruption and abuse of power, are common in democracies globally, but these rarely involve direct allegations of acting on behalf of a foreign state in the conduct of foreign policy.48

V. Case Study I: The 2019 Trump-Ukraine Scandal

The 2019 Trump-Ukraine scandal provides a critical lens through which to examine the interplay of domestic politics, U.S. law, and international norms in the context of a U.S. President's actions concerning a foreign state.

A. Overview of Allegations and Events

The scandal primarily revolved around allegations that President Donald Trump attempted to pressure Ukraine into investigating his political rival, Joe Biden, and a debunked theory that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections.23 This pressure allegedly involved withholding $391 million in congressionally approved military aid to Ukraine and conditioning a White House meeting for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the announcement of these investigations.23

Key events included a July 25, 2019, phone call between Trump and Zelenskyy, where Trump asked Zelenskyy to "do us a favor" and investigate the CrowdStrike server and the Bidens.23 While the White House memo of the call was not a verbatim transcript, it captured the essence of the conversation.50 Trump's personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, and other political appointees reportedly conducted an "irregular policy channel" outside of the U.S. State Department, which ran "contrary to the goals of longstanding U.S. policy".23 Ukrainian officials were reportedly informed that a meeting between the two leaders was conditioned on Zelenskyy announcing the investigations.23

B. Violations of U.S. Domestic Law

The Trump administration's withholding of military aid to Ukraine was found to be illegal under U.S. domestic law. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent, non-partisan watchdog, issued a legal opinion stating that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) illegally withheld the foreign aid, violating the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (ICA).4 The ICA was enacted to curb presidential impoundment of appropriated funds, a practice notably abused by President Nixon.30 The GAO concluded that the Trump administration "brazenly and knowingly abused his power" by ignoring congressional warnings against illegal impoundments.4

Violations of the ICA, while not criminal offenses, implicate the President's constitutional obligation to ensure laws are faithfully executed.3 The White House was reportedly aware the hold was illegal but continued it.3 This action represented a significant challenge to Congress's constitutional "power of the purse" and raised concerns about executive overreach in foreign policy.4

The scandal ultimately led to President Trump's impeachment by the House of Representatives in December 2019 on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress.23 The abuse of power charge stemmed directly from the allegations of pressuring Ukraine to investigate political rivals by withholding aid.24 Although Trump was acquitted by the Senate in February 2020, the episode highlighted the challenges of holding a president accountable when their party controls Congress and fueled debates about executive power and immunity.24

C. Implications for International Law and Norms

While the 2019 scandal primarily centered on U.S. domestic law and political processes, it carried significant implications for international law and norms, particularly concerning Ukraine's sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.

The act of conditioning vital military aid on a foreign government's initiation of politically motivated investigations could be interpreted as a form of coercive intervention in Ukraine's internal affairs. Such actions, even if falling short of military force, can "impair sovereign autonomy" and undermine a state's "sovereign discretion".5 By attempting to compel Ukraine to undertake specific domestic policies for U.S. political benefit, the Trump administration's actions touched upon the "domaine réservé" of Ukraine, potentially violating the principle of non-intervention.5 This type of "paternalistic interference" can be harmful, as it uses pretexts to mask self-interested motives and deprives the targeted state of its autonomy as a political community.36

Although the actions were not directly "on Russia's behalf" in the sense of being instructed by Moscow, the weakening of Ukraine's position and the disruption of its relationship with its primary security benefactor (the U.S.) could indirectly benefit Russia. Any action that destabilizes Ukraine or reduces its capacity to resist Russian aggression, regardless of intent, serves Russia's geopolitical interests. The withholding of aid and the imposition of political conditions could be seen as eroding international support for Ukraine, thereby creating a more favorable environment for Russian objectives. This demonstrates how actions driven by domestic political agendas can have profound, albeit indirect, consequences that align with the strategic goals of an adversarial foreign power.

VI. Case Study II: The 2025 Trump Administration and the Russia-Ukraine War

The hypothetical 2025 Trump administration's approach to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, as described in the provided information, presents a more direct and concerning scenario regarding potential alignment with Russian interests and challenges to international law.

A. Policy Shifts and Statements

Upon returning to office in January 2025, the Trump administration reportedly upended the U.S. approach to the Ukraine conflict, treating Russia "increasingly not as an adversary, but an ally".6 This shift involved several key policy changes and statements:

• Suspension of Military Assistance and Intelligence: The U.S. reportedly suspended military assistance and intelligence sharing with Kyiv.6 This directly impacts Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russian aggression, particularly given its existing manpower shortages.15

• Direct Engagement with Putin, Exclusion of Zelenskyy: President Trump announced a highly anticipated meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on August 15, 2025, aimed at brokering a peace deal.9 This meeting was planned to occur
  before any sit-down discussion involving Ukrainian President Zelenskyy.11 Notably, a U.S. envoy's proposal for a three-way summit including Zelenskyy was "completely ignored" by the Kremlin.10 The choice of Alaska as a summit venue was seen as symbolically favoring Russia, potentially evoking the historical Alaska Purchase to suggest a precedent for territorial exchange.10

• Proposal for "Swapping of Territories": Trump hinted at a peace deal involving "some swapping of territories" between Ukraine and Russia, though no specifics were provided.9 This suggestion was immediately rejected by President Zelenskyy, who stated that Ukraine "will not give Russia any awards for what it has done" and that "Ukrainians will not give their land to the occupier".11

• Ruling Out NATO Membership for Ukraine: On the same day as the Trump-Putin call, the U.S. Defense Secretary reportedly ruled out NATO membership for Ukraine, deeming it "unrealistic" to expect Ukraine to return to its pre-2014 borders.6

• Statements on Russian Strength and Sanctions: Trump stated that "Russia has all the cards" and that Ukraine should "recognise the reality on the ground".1 He also expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia, noting that Russia is "pretty good at avoiding sanctions".14 Despite threatening new sanctions on Moscow and countries buying Russian oil, he also imposed tariffs on Indian goods over India's imports of Russian oil, a direct financial penalty on a Russian oil customer.9

B. Analysis under International Law

The described actions and statements of the 2025 Trump administration raise serious questions under international law, particularly concerning the prohibition on the use of force, non-intervention, and the law of treaties.

• Violations of UN Charter Article 2(4) and Jus Cogens Norms: Trump's statements that "Russia has all the cards" and that Ukraine should "recognise the reality on the ground" are directly analyzed as violations of UN Charter Article 2(4) and Ukraine's right to self-determination.1 These statements, especially when coupled with proposals for "swapping of territories," implicitly endorse or legitimize Russia's territorial gains achieved through aggression, which is categorically prohibited under international law.2 The acquisition of territory through force (conquest) is a
  jus cogens violation.2 Aiding and abetting the international crime of waging a war of aggression could itself be an international crime.1

• Strategic Coercion and Non-Intervention: The administration's approach constitutes a form of "strategic coercion" against Ukraine.5 By suspending military assistance and intelligence, ruling out NATO membership, and proposing territorial concessions without Ukraine's full consent, the U.S. would be exerting pressure that "constrains sovereign discretion" and "distorts the lawful processes through which territorial consent is expressed".5 This creates a "cumulative environment" where Ukraine's "freedom to say no becomes legally compromised".5 Such actions, even if not involving direct military force, fall into the "grey zone" of non-forcible coercion and can be seen as prohibited intervention, as they aim to compel Ukraine to accept terms it is not obligated to under international law and which fall within its sovereignty.2

• Law of Treaties (VCLT Article 52): Any "peace deal" resulting from such coercion, particularly one involving territorial concessions, would face significant legal challenges under VCLT Article 52. If the conclusion of a treaty has been "procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations," it is void.34 Given Russia's ongoing unlawful use of force in Ukraine, any agreement that formalizes its territorial gains would likely be considered void under this principle, as it would be seen as directly procured by aggression.34 The international community is obliged not to recognize such illegal gains.34

C. Perceived Alignment with Russian Geopolitical Interests

Regardless of the stated intentions, the described actions of the 2025 Trump administration align significantly with Russia's long-standing geopolitical objectives in Ukraine and the broader international system.

• Legitimizing Russian Aggression: Russia's official conditions for a peace deal include recognition of all occupied land as Russian, being handed all claimed but not fully controlled provinces, guarantees that Ukraine will never join NATO, and the lifting of sanctions.17 Trump's suggestion of "swapping of territories" and his administration's ruling out of NATO membership for Ukraine directly cater to these Russian demands.6 By proposing such terms and meeting with Putin before Zelenskyy, the U.S. would effectively grant Russia validation and a platform to legitimize its illegal annexations and aggression.11 This would undermine the international legal principle that gains from unlawful force are not to be recognized.34

• Weakening Ukraine's Defense and Sovereignty: Suspending military assistance and intelligence directly weakens Ukraine's ability to defend its territorial integrity and political independence.6 This aligns with Russia's objective of "demilitarization" of Ukraine, which in its extreme form could mean Ukrainian disarmament and regime change.17 By pressuring Ukraine to accept unfavorable terms, the U.S. would contribute to eroding Ukraine's sovereign discretion and potentially force it into a position where it cannot recover lost territories, effectively ceding them to Russia.8

• Undermining Transatlantic Alliances and NATO: Trump's consistent questioning of NATO's value and calls for European allies to take greater responsibility for their own defense, while presented as a legitimate burden-sharing initiative, contribute to a narrative of weakening transatlantic solidarity.6 Russia has long sought to undermine NATO's "open-door" policy and its expansion eastward.17 Actions that distance the U.S. from its European allies or reduce its military presence in Europe serve Russia's strategic goal of weakening the Western alliance and creating a more favorable balance of power in Europe.7 This approach, even if framed as beneficial for U.S. domestic interests, is perceived by many in Europe as a way for the United States to quietly distance itself from both the war in Ukraine and its European allies.7

• Facilitating a "Sphere of Influence": Some analysts suggest that a U.S. policy of accommodating Russia over Ukraine, particularly through territorial concessions and ruling out NATO membership, could be interpreted as granting Russia a "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe.27 While some argue this could drive a wedge between Russia and China, it would fundamentally alter the post-Cold War security architecture and legitimize Russia's aggressive foreign policy.27

The convergence of these policy shifts with Russia's stated and implied objectives creates a strong perception that the Trump administration's actions, regardless of direct instructions, are indeed serving Russia's geopolitical interests. This dynamic highlights the critical difference between a leader acting on behalf of a foreign power (implying agency) and a leader whose actions benefit a foreign power due to a convergence of strategic outlooks or the indirect consequences of domestically driven policies.

VII. Synthesis and Conclusion: Is Donald Trump Acting on Russia's Behalf?

The comprehensive analysis of Donald Trump's actions concerning Russia and Ukraine, viewed through the lens of international law and U.S. domestic legal frameworks, reveals a complex picture. The central question of whether he is "acting on Russia's behalf" requires a careful distinction between direct agency and the strategic benefits accruing to Russia from his policies.

A. The Challenge of Proving "Agency"

From a strict legal standpoint, proving that a U.S. President is "acting on behalf" of a foreign power, meaning under their explicit "instructions of, or under the direction or control of" that foreign power 33, presents an exceptionally high evidentiary bar. The President of the United States is the nation's chief diplomat and commander-in-chief, and their actions are generally presumed to be sovereign acts of the United States. To demonstrate direct agency would require compelling evidence of subordination of U.S. national interests to Russia's directives, rather than merely a shared strategic perspective or coincidental alignment of outcomes. The provided information does not contain direct evidence of such explicit instructions or control from the Russian Federation over Donald Trump's decisions. The U.S. domestic legal frameworks like FARA and the Logan Act, while relevant to foreign influence, are not designed to attribute the actions of a sitting head of state to foreign control in the conduct of official foreign policy. Historically, cases of individuals acting on behalf of foreign powers, such as Aldrich Ames, involved clandestine espionage, a fundamentally different scenario from a publicly elected leader's policy decisions.46

B. Convergence of Interests and Strategic Benefits for Russia

While direct legal proof of agency remains elusive, the cumulative effect of Donald Trump's foreign policy decisions, particularly concerning Ukraine, has consistently and demonstrably resulted in significant strategic benefits for Russia. This outcome arises from a convergence of interests, where Trump's "America First" approach and skepticism towards traditional alliances align with Russia's revisionist goals.

The 2019 Trump-Ukraine scandal, characterized by the illegal withholding of military aid and attempts to pressure Ukraine for domestic political gain, weakened Ukraine's position and disrupted its critical security relationship with the U.S..3 Although driven by internal U.S. political motives, the consequence was a reduction in Ukraine's capacity to resist Russian influence and aggression.

The hypothetical 2025 scenario presents an even clearer alignment. The suspension of aid and intelligence, the proposal for "swapping of territories," and the ruling out of NATO membership for Ukraine directly echo Russia's maximalist demands for a peace settlement.6 These actions, if implemented, would effectively legitimize Russia's illegal territorial gains, undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and self-determination, and weaken the collective security framework that has historically deterred Russian expansionism.1 The emphasis on a bilateral meeting with Putin before Zelenskyy further grants Russia a platform and validation, which its leadership actively seeks.10

This pattern suggests that regardless of whether Trump is acting on instruction from Russia, his policies frequently serve Russia's strategic objectives. This is particularly evident in the consistent efforts to undermine NATO and other transatlantic alliances, a long-standing goal for Moscow.6 The U.S. administration's rhetoric and actions, even if framed as legitimate U.S. foreign policy to shift defense burdens or prioritize domestic concerns, contribute to a narrative of weakening Western unity and resolve, thereby creating a more permissive environment for Russian geopolitical ambitions.

C. Broader Implications for the International Legal Order

The dynamic observed in Trump's approach to Russia and Ukraine carries profound implications for the international legal order. When a major power like the United States consistently challenges or appears to disregard fundamental principles of international law—such as the prohibition on the use of force, territorial integrity, and non-intervention—it contributes to a systemic erosion of these norms. This erosion creates a dangerous precedent, making it more difficult to hold other states, including Russia, accountable for their violations. The ambiguity surrounding "non-forcible coercion" and the exploitation of "grey zones" in international law further complicate enforcement and accountability, potentially leading to a more unstable, "might-makes-right" global environment.5

The credibility of the UN Charter system and the efficacy of international law depend on consistent adherence by all states, especially powerful ones. Actions that, even indirectly, legitimize aggression or undermine the sovereign equality of states risk unraveling the post-World War II international order. The case of Donald Trump's foreign policy towards Russia and Ukraine thus serves as a critical case study in the challenges of maintaining a rules-based international system in an era of shifting geopolitical alignments and domestic political pressures. The question is not merely one of direct agency, but of the cumulative impact of policy choices that, by design or consequence, align with and empower adversarial foreign powers.

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